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The Sinful University?                                                                                                
 
  Daniel James Cook 
In this paper, I will defend the thesis that if our contemporary University presumes 
an incomplete ontology of the human being, as its educational philosophy seems 
to suggest, then in the moral language of Josef Pieper and Jacques Maritain, it 
may be understood to be sinful as an institution.  
     There is a difference between doing something well and doing something 
good. And there is a difference between failing to do something well, and failing 
to do something good. Josef Pieper discusses this difference in The Concept of 
Sin. For Pieper, I fail to do something well when I fail “to get ‘just right’ whatever 
goal [I have] in mind.”1 Pieper refers to this as an‘artistic failure,’ where a person 
has some end in mind, but their means of attaining that end fails. For example, I 
aim to bake a batch of cookies, but I miss a necessary step. I forget to mix the dry 
ingredients before incorporating the wet ingredients and the batch is ruined. 
Failing to do something well involves means. 
    Failing to do something good involves ends. As Pieper writes, “one might 
reach the goal set for oneself…but at the same time, for that same reason, will 
have violated the universal goal of existence as a whole.”2 In this sense of failure, 
one achieves the end they have in mind, but that end is morally noxious. It is an 
end one ought not to achieve, because it is an end that is wrong. Pieper’s own 
example demonstrates this kind of failure quite nicely: the nuclear bomb. The 
nuclear bomb achieves the end of mass murder well, but that end is morally 
noxious—it is sinful. 
    I would like to think of the University in this second sense of failure. While the 
University can be ineffective, or fail to function well, there is more at stake if the 
University, as an institution, is in conflict with nature. That is, it is one thing for the 
University to be ineffective in its means, but here I will pose the following 
question: Is our contemporary University sinful?  
     In order to pose this question, we must first have some understanding of what 
the right end of the university is. That is, where should the university aim, and how 
can the university set its aim so as to not come into conflict with nature?  
     In his short work regarding University education, Education At The Crossroads, 
Jacques Maritain makes the observation that because “the aim of education is the 
helping and guiding of man toward his [or her] own human achievement,” 3 any 
given university, as an educational institution, always and already presupposes an  
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2 Pieper, The Concept of Sin, trans. Edward T. Oakes, 25. 
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ontology of the human being. This means that any existing university presumes an 
idea of what the human being essentially is, and it guides its students towards this 
idea. As such, we can understand the aim of the university to be the idea of the 
human being that its education presumes. 
     Of course, the human ontology held by a given institution can be either right or 
wrong. If there is a true human nature, a university can both aim toward that true 
human nature, and guide its students toward becoming full human beings, or it 
can aim elsewhere and lead them astray. In order to know whether or not a 
university is aimed where it ought to be—that is, guiding its students towards the 
truly human—we must first understand what the human being essentially is. 
In his article, “The Person and the Common Good,” Maritain explains that the 
human being is both an individual and a person. This is not meant in a dualistic 
sense—a human is not made up of two distinct and separate parts; rather, the 
human being is simultaneously, essentially, and indivisibly both an individual and a 
person. As Maritain writes: “our whole being is an individual by reason of that in 
us which derives from matter, and a person by reason of that in us which derives 
from spirit.”4 The human being is an individual insofar as he or she is “a fragment 
of species, a part of the universe, a unique point in the immense web of cosmic, 
ethnical, historical forces and influences—and bound by their laws.”5 For Maritain 
it is our material distinctiveness and intelligibility from one another—our 
qualities—that mark our individuality.  
Personhood is more difficult to understand. Maritain observes that “love is not 
concerned with qualities.”6 It is not the beloved’s individuality that we love, rather 
“we love the deepest, most substantial and hidden, the most existing reality of the 
beloved being…a metaphysical center deeper than all the qualities and essences 
which we can find and enumerate.”7 It is the beloved’s person that we love. Unlike 
the material qualities that individuate a human being, that make him or her a part 
of the world, a part of the social, and a part of the political, Maritain writes that 
“the person as such is an independent whole and that which is noblest in all of 
nature.”8 Whereas a human being is an individual insofar as it is a part, it is a 
person insofar as it is a whole unto itself. Of course, for Maritain the human person 
is not unqualifiedly autonomous. On the contrary, the human person is  
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Emphasis my own. 
5 Maritain, “The Person and the Common Good,” 431. 
6 Maritain, “The Person and the Common Good,” 431. 
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“nonetheless… at the lowest degree of personality.”9 The created and whole 
human person is an image of the uncreated whole that is God.  
For Maritain, personhood is defined “in terms of independence, as a reality which, 
subsisting spiritually, constitutes a universe unto itself, a relatively independent 
whole within the great whole of the universe, facing the transcendent whole which 
is God.”10 We can explain the autonomy of the human person if we understand 
the difference between negative liberty and positive liberty. Negative liberty is the 
freedom from external restraint, a kind of complete and utter autonomy. This is 
not the liberty that characterizes the human person. Rather, the human person is 
characterized by a positive liberty: the freedom to ‘face the transcendent,’ and to 
understand itself as a created whole. 
     In The Uses of Knowledge, John Henry Newman describes a University that 
educates its students as though they are human persons, and not merely human 
individuals. For Newman, the University is “a place of teaching universal 
knowledge.”11 It is the site where a knowledge, that is universal, is extended to 
the student, and not a place where knowledge is discovered and advanced. In 
order to understand what this means, we first must make sense of the way in which 
Newman understands knowledge to be universal.  
     Newman writes that “all branches of knowledge are connected together, 
because the subject-matter of knowledge is intimately united in itself, as being 
that acts and the work of the Creator.”12 This means that knowledge is always 
knowledge of nature, and insofar nature is the work of a benevolent God, it is 
orderly and harmonious in and of itself. For Newman, knowledge is universal when 
it is knowledge of a thing that is universal: nature. It not the role of the University 
to extend a particular knowledge; a knowledge that is divorced from the whole, 
but to deliver a universal knowledge: knowledge of nature. However, Newman 
does not mean that the University delivers a complete knowledge of nature to the 
student; rather, Newman puts forth the principle that “all Knowledge is a whole 
and the separate Sciences part of one.” 13   In order to extend a universal 
knowledge, the University must teach the individual sciences that are parts of the 
whole of knowledge as parts of the whole. For example, the University should not 
teach Biology as a complete picture of the way that things are, but as a unique 
and complete worldview all on its own—including an account of Ethics, Physics, 
Psychology, etc.—because, for Newman, this would mean to “unsettle the  
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boundary lines between science and science.”14 In doing this, the University would 
over-assert the role that the particular science plays in an understanding of the 
whole, which would mean to take away from the role some other science plays in 
that understanding. 
     When the University extends a universal knowledge, by teaching the particular 
sciences as contributing parts to the whole knowledge of nature, the University 
delivers what Newman believes is the goal of the University: a liberal education. 
Newman's idea of a liberal education consists in cultivating an intellectual 
healthiness that is an end unto itself. The intellect is not cultivated as a means for 
some external end, such as a practical art or a moral condition; rather, the end of 
this cultivation is this cultivation. This is how education is an end unto itself: the 
end of liberal education, which cultivates the intellect to understand the particular 
sciences as parts of a unified whole, is to understand the particular sciences as 
parts of a unified whole. Newman thinks that the University should cultivate the 
intellectual health of the student—not as a means for some external end, such as a 
practical art or a moral condition—but because the human intellect itself is worthy 
of cultivation: it is an end unto itself. 
     However, the autonomy of this intellectual health needs qualification. As was 
the case with Maritain’s human person, Newman’s University does not intend to 
make one free in a negative sense. Intellectual cultivation does not confer radical 
and absolute autonomy upon the student. Rather, cultivating the intellect gives 
the human being the freedom to place the particulars of his or her experience 
within the greater whole. Newman’s theory of education assumes that the student 
is an end unto him or herself, and in doing so, it presumes that the human being is 
a person, and not merely or solely an individual. 
     Let us return to the topic at hand. For Maritain, an educational institution can 
misunderstand the human being. It can be ignorant of the human person, and 
guide its students exclusively towards human individuality. When the university 
misunderstands the human being as merely an individual, as a consequence it 
undervalues the human being. It places him or her underneath the social, the 
political, and the material—it sutures his or her education to the demands of the 
social, the political, and the material. When an educational institution presupposes 
this ontological misunderstanding, it treats the human being as only a part of the 
social, political, and material whole—as worthy of cultivation only for their sake, 
and not as an end unto itself.  
     This seems to happen in the contemporary world. I would like to suggest that 
MacEwan University, our university, functions on just such an ontological 
misunderstanding. Both the Board of Governors and the Academic Council of  
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MacEwan University have approved the following 'educational philosophy' which 
is readily available on our institution's website: 
We endeavor to enhance our students’ capacity to live well-balanced, 
productive lives as citizens of our interconnected world. Our links with  
communities beyond the University—academic and professional, local 
and international—ensure the relevance of learning activities and 
enable students to move confidently into the workforce or on to further 
educational opportunities.15 
 
While it is not self-evident that a public statement such as this educational 
philosophy can be understood as the perfect image of the sort of education 
delivered by our institution, I think that we can nonetheless interpret it to be at 
least symptomatic of the assumptions that are made by our institution. This is to 
say, I think that interpreting this educational philosophy can provide us with 
evidence of where our university is aimed that is not entirely out to lunch.  
If this is a more or less accurate portrayal of the goals of our educational 
institution, then our institution explicitly conceives of the human being as merely 
an individual. This educational philosophy suggests that our education is delivered 
in order that we students may achieve the end of living a 'productive life' whether 
that means entering the workforce or going on to receive additional specialized 
education. It guides the student towards fulfilling the demands of the world we 
live in. It cultivates the student as though he or she is merely an individual part, 
and not a whole unto him or herself, worthy of cultivation for his or her own sake. 
     If Maritain and Newman are right, that as human beings we are worthy of 
cultivation for our own sake, then the education that thinks of the human being as 
only a producer, a citizen, and a worker has the wrong aim. Rather than guiding its 
students towards what is truly human, this sort of Education denies human 
personhood and leads its students astray, and in Pieper's moral terms, this kind of 
education is noxious because it is not aimed where it ought to be. It has the 
wrong end. The institution that delivers this sort of education is sinful. If the 
'educational philosophy' provided by MacEwan University reveals its true aim—
that is, if MacEwan University is actually aimed towards the cultivation of the 
student as only a worker, producer, and citizen, without any eye to his or her 
human personhood, then, in the moral terms laid out by Pieper and Maritain, our 
university has the wrong aim, and it assumes an incomplete ontology of the 
human being. It is sinful. 
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